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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA M. HOVE,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

)
)

JOHN S. McMASTER, D.D.S., and
HIGHLAND DENT AL CLINIC, INC. ,
a professional corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No. 16850

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is

malpractice.

an

action

for

damages

resulting

from

an

act of

dental

The only issue before the court is whether appellant's claim is

barred by the statute of limitations contained in the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, § 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The trial in this action was bifurcated,

and the issue of whether

appellant's claim was timely filed under the Act was tried to the court without
a jury.

The court held that appellant's claim was barred by the applicable

statute of limitations for the reason that appellant failed to commence her
action against respondents within two years from the date on which she knew
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or reasonably should have known that she had sustained an injury and that it
was caused by the defendant John S. McMaster, D .D.S.

Appellant_'s com-

plaint was dismissed with prejudice, and respondents were awarded their
costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and entry of judgment in her
favor that her claim, as a matter of law, is not barred by the statute of
limitations.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 27, 1974, appellant, Barbara M. Hove (hereinafter "Hove"),
a registered. nurse and housewife,
D. D.S.

visited respondent John S. McMaster,

(hereinafter "Dr. McMaster"), at his office at the Highland Dental

Clinic, for the purpose of having a cavity filled in the upper right second
molar (R. 22).

Preparatory to the filling, Dr. McMaster made two injections

of an anesthetic (R. 22).

After the first injection, Dr. McMaster started

drilling on the tooth, but the injection did not appear to deaden the pain, so
he gave Hove a second injection (R. 23).

During the second injection, the

needle "hit something hard . . . and then he [Dr. McMaster] kept pushing it
and then it seemed to give way and hit something soft and when it did I
[Hove] got the shock in my face.

"

(R. 24.)

Hove felt that the shock sensation was "unusual" or "different," but
attributed the sensation to the dual injections, which she had never before
undergone (R. 27).
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After the numbness of the anesthesia dissipated, Hove experienced a
"plugged-up" sensation on the right side of her face and nose (R. 28).
During the months immediately following the injection, she experienced a
tingling sensation in the same area and suffered from several bloodshot right
eyes

and

pressure

behind

that

eye (R. 12,

28).

She conveyed these

problems to Dr. McMaster on several occasions, and he advised her to "take
some aspirin and it would calm down and go away" (R. 29) .
Approximately six months after the injection, the symptoms subsided,
but then, after a few months, they again flared up.
for more than three years (R. 30, 49, 50).

This pattern persisted

Hove testified that she knew

something was wrong--that "something felt funny"--but she did not attribute
the problem specifically to the injection (R. 29).

Approximately one year

after the injection, in February 1975, Hove suggested to Dr. McMaster that
she might visit a neurologist in an attempt to determine the origin of her
symptoms, and Dr. McMaster agreed that that would be a good idea (R. 30).
On February 24, 1975, Hove visited Wayne Hebertson, M.D., a neurologist, who performed a neurological examination (R. 31, 70, 71).

On the basis

of his examination, Dr. Hebertson concluded that there were several possible
explanations

for

the

symptoms:

local infection of facial nerves

due to

"shingles, 11 arthritis in the jaw joints, a complication arising out of the dental
injection, "and/or some other dental source of pain in her mouth and jaw"
(R. 71).

No abnormalities could be detected and no definite diagnosis was

rendered (R. 72).

He at no time suggested to Hove that her symptoms were

the product of neurological injury resulting from the dental injection (R. 39).
On September 9, 1975, Hove visited a second dentist, Wayne Provost,
D.D.S., for a second opinion concerning her symptoms (R. 32, 39, 58).
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asked Dr. Provost whether the pain on the right side of her face could be
due to the dental injection (R. 58).

Dr.

Provost replied that that was

"unlikely" (R. 58), and he too never suggested that the problem was of a
neurological nature (R. 39).
In November 1975, Hove sought treatment for her bloodshot right eye
from an opthamologist, George S. Tanner, M. D.

Dr. Tanner could off er no

diagnosis of the problem (R. 40).
In March, 1977, Hove awoke in the middle of the night with excruciating
pain in the same area of the face and jaw (R. 34).

She again sought

Dr. Provost's treatment, and he ref erred her to an endodontist, Richard
Ellgren, D. D.S. (R. 34).

Dr. Ellgren examined Hove and opined that he felt

the problem was sinus related (R. 34).

Therefore, he ref erred Hove to

Glen K. Lund, M. D. , an ear, nose and throat specialist.

Dr. Lund examined

her on March 10, 1977, and diagnosed the problem as a "nasal obstruction"
and

as

(R. 65).

"atypical facial neuralgia,"

possibly due to the dental injection

However, Dr. Lund testified that he did not tell Hove of this.

portion of the diagnosis (R. 65), and Hove so testified (R. 42).
Continuing her efforts to uncover the cause of her symptoms, Hove
visited a second neurologist, Leonard W. Jarcho, M.D., on April 26, 1977
(R. 73, 74).

Dr. Jarcho conducted a complete neurological examination and

could find no evidence of neurological injury (R. 74).

Indeed, he concluded

that there was no direct connection between the dental injection and her
complaints (R. 74).
In June 1977, Hove and her family moved to Cleveland, Ohio.
visited another dentist,

Stewart Katz, D.D.S.

(R. 43).

There she

She explained to

him her symptoms, but he was unable to make a diagnosis (R. 43, 44).
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In

September, 1977, Hove began experiencing some "tugging" at the corner of
her right eye and some aching above the tooth treated by Dr, McMaster, so
Dr. Katz

referred her to another endodontist in Cleveland,

(R. 44).

Dr. Falkner performed an examination, but could off er no diagnosis

(R. 44).
(R. 44).

Shortly

thereafter,

an

internist,

Dr. Mengies,

Dr. Falkner

examined Hove

His diagnosis, if any, is unclear (R. 35, 44).

Finally, in October 1977, Hove visited yet another neurologist, Patrick
Sweeney, M. D.

Dr. Sweeney performed a thorough neurological examination,

and advised Hove for the first time that she was suffering from !!atypical
facial pain due to causalgia 11 which was probably caused by Dr. McMaster's
injection of three and a half years earlier (R. 46, 49).

No other physician

prior to this had advised Hove that this was the problem (R. 46, 49).
the

following

day,

another

neurologist,

Dr. Sweeney's diagnosis (R. 47).

John Gardner,

On

M, D, , confirmed

Dr. Gardner's diagnosis was that:

This patient has suffered causalgia resulting from mechanical
more than chemical injury to the maxillary nerve, the second
division of the trigeminal or fifth cranial nerve. Onset precisely at
the time of dental manipulation does provide a very clearcut
etiological relationship to this procedure. The type of pain which
she describes and the response to stellate ganglion injection are all
very consistent with causalgia. The remaining pain is less specific,
but of similar origin. I see no other reasonable cause for her
symptoms. (Ex. P-1.)

On December 29, 1977, Hove served a Notice of Intent to Commence
Action upon Dr. McMaster.

Her complaint was filed on February 22, 1978.
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT'S ACTION IS
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SINCE HER ACTION
WAS FILED WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE DATE ON WHICH SHE
KNEW OR COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO KNOW THAT A
KNOWN INJURY WAS CAUSED BY WHAT IS ALLEGED TO BE A
NEGLIGENT ACT.
The statute of limitations contained in the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act, § 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), provides:
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence . . . . [Emphasis added.]

At issue in the instant case is whether "the injury" occurred on the date
of Dr. McMasterts injection into Hove's gum--February 27, 1974--or on the
date on which Hove was first told by any physician or dentist that her
symptoms were the manifestations of injury to the second division of the
trigeminal nerve caused by the injection--October 1977.

The issue and facts

of this case are practically indistinguishable from those addressed recently by
this court in Foil

~.

Ballinger, 601 P. 2d 144 (1979).

The proper construction to be accorded the term "injury" in the above
statute was a major issue resolved by this court in Foil.

In that case, plain·

tiff sustained a back injury in 1967 which required repeated treatment and
surgery.

On January 18, 1974, plaintiff was administered a permanent sub·

arachnoid phenol block.

F~llowing

this surgical procedure, she suffered from

certain rectal and bladder problems and,
problems,

.underwent

additional

surgery.

in an effort to remedy those
Her

condition

persisted and

presumably she underwent further examinations in an effort to uncover the
reasons for her continuing problems.

On June 23, 1977, a medical panel
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submitted a written report concerning plaintiff's medical condition to the Utah
State Industrial Commission.

The report disclosed that both the rectal and

the bladder problems of the plaintiff had been caused primarily by the
subarachnoid block administered on January 18, 1974.
In response to plaintiff's claim that the surgeon who performed the block
operation was guilty of malpractice, defendant argued that the action filed
January 10, 1978, was time-barred because plaintiff knew of her injury at or
shortly after the administration of the subarachnoid block in January 1974.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that the crucial date for determining
when the limitations period commenced to run was the date she first became
aware of the causal relationship between her physical problems and the
alleged negligent operation, that being June 23, 1977, when the medical panel
submitted its report.
This court stated the issue as follows:

"whether the statute of limita-

tions commences to run from the date of injury or from the date an injured
person knows or should know that a known injury was caused by what is
alleged to be a negligent act."

Id. , at 145 ) .

The conclusion, based upon

the nature of malpractice actions and prior Utah law, was that "the statute
begins to run when an injured person knows or should know that he has
suffered a legal injury (Id. at 147) (emphasis added~.

That is, "[t]he two

year provision does not commence to run until the injured person knew or
should have known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was
caused by negligent action."

Id. , at 148.

Thus, this court rejected the

notion that the limitations period necessarily begins to run from the date on
which physical symptoms first appear, since even though the patient "may be
aware of a disability or dysfunction, there may be, to the untutored under-
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standing of the average layman (and 'even those who are trained in medical
science'

such

as

Hove),

no

apparent

connection between the treatment

provided by a physician and the injury suffered."

Id., at 147 ·

For this

reason, "when injuries are suffered that have been caused by an unknown act
of negligence by an expert, the law ought not to be construed to destroy a
right of action before a person even becomes aware of the existence of that
right."

Id., at 147.

This court found support for its holding in the earlier Utah case of
Christiansen

~.

Rees, 20 Utah2d 199, 436 P. 2d 435 (1968).

Christiansen in-

volved an action for injuries suffered due to alleged negligence in leaving a
broken surgical needle in the plaintiff.

The location of the needle was not

disclosed nor discovered until almost ten years after the operation in which it
was used.

The action was filed soon after discovery, but apparently beyond

the applicable limitations period.

The court adopted plaintiff's contention that

the statute did not begin to run until plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the existence of the foreign object.

In Foil, this court reasoned that

it could see "no basis for making a legal distinction between having no
knowledge of an injury, as was the case in Christiansen, and no knowledge
that a known injury was caused by unknown negligence."

Id. , at 148.

In the instant case, Mrs. Hove underwent dental treatment on February
27, 1974.

From the moment of injection and thereafter to the present she

suffered from the physical symptoms previously described.

She diligently

sought medical attention from at least 12, doctors in an effort to uncover the
cause of her disabilities.
dentists,

two

Prior to October, 1977, she was

neurologists,

three

endodontists,

one

opthamologist, one ontolarynologist, and one internist.

ex~ined

by three

periodontist,

one

In almost four years,
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not one of them diagnosed neurological injury to the second division of the
trigeminal nerve (R. 49, 50), and only Dr. Hebertson even remotely hinted
that

Hove's

problem

originated

with

the

dental

injection.

But

even

Dr. Hebertson testified that he could detect no abnormalities and could render
no definite diagnosis (R. 71).
It was

not until the neurological examinations by Drs. Sweeny and

Gardner in October 1977 that the injury was diagnosed as nerve damage which
was likely caused by Dr. McMaster's dental treatment of February 27, 1974.
Until that time, Hove was unaware that the symptoms plaguing her were the
products of neurological injury.

Once this became clear, a Notice of Intent to

Commence Action was promptly filed and a complaint was issued before the
expiration of four years from the date of the alleged negligence.
Hove exercised exceptional diligence to discover the reasons for her
physical problems.

How could she have possibly known prior to October,

1977, that those problems were caused by a negligent act if the very doctors
and dentists she consulted could offer her no clue that that was in fact the
problem?

Since her diligence in attempting to discover the origin of her

problems was reasonable, according to Foil, the date on which she in fact
discovered that origin--October 1977--is the date on which the statute of
limitations commences to run.

As such, the action was timely filed and her

claim preserved.
The trial court's finding to the contrary is clearly against the weight of
the evidence and it manifestly appears that it misapplied the law embodied in
Foil to the established facts.

In such instances, a reviewing court may

depart from the general rule that the trial court's findings are entitled to
deference and will not be disturbed on appeal.

Brown v. Board of Education
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. of Morgan County School District, 560 P. 2d 1129, (Utah 1977); Hardy v.
·-Hendrickson, 17 Utah2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972).
The evidence here is clear that while Hove knew that she had a
"problem" from the moment of the injection, for three and a half years
thereafter she could obtain absolutely no diagnosis that this "problem" was
caused

by

negligence in that injection (R. 49).

The defendant himself

recommended only that she "take some aspirin and it would calm down
away" (R. 29).

a~d

go

The ensuing string of 12 physicians and dentists could offer

no definite explanation for the cause of her problem.

Knowledge of the "legal

injury" was obtained only at the time Drs. Sweeny and Gardner rendered
their diagnoses that her problem was causally related to the dental injection
three and a half years earlier.
in effect did, that

11

It strains credulity to say, as the trial court

Mrs. Hove, even though the record is clear that not one

of the 12 physicians and dentists you visited prior to October, 1977 could tell
you that your problem was caused by Dr. McMaster's injection, this court is
nevertheless convinced that you knew or had reason to know that you had a
cause of action against Dr. McMaster on the date of the injection."

If 12

experts could not determine the nature of her problem, how could she
possibly be held to know or have reason to know that she had sustained a
legal injury on the date of the injection?

The trial court's holding that she

did know or had reason to know is clearly against the weight of the evidence
and represents a misapplication of the teachings of Foil.

CONCLUSION
From

the date of the dental injection on February 27,

1974, Hove

experienced symptoms of pressure, pain and tingling in the area of her right
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cheek and jaw.

During the next three and a half years, she visited no fewer

than 12 physicians and dentists in an effort to determine the cause of these
symptoms.

None could off er a definite diagnosis.

In October, 1977, she

learned for the first time that her injury was neurological and was likely
caused by Dr. McMaster' s negligence.

Therefore, the date on which she first

learned that she had suffered a legal injury, as defined by Foil, was October
1977.

It is difficult to imagine diligence more reasonable; and since she could

have no reason to know that she had suffered a legal injury, the date on
which she in fact discovered that she had suffered a legal injury is the date
on which the statute of limitations commenced to run.

From the date of that

discovery she acted promptly to file her action prior to the expiration of four
years from the date of the injection.
The trial court's holding that Hove knew or reasonably should have
known that she had suffered a legal injury at least two years before she
commenced her action is contrary to the weight of the evidence and is a
misapplication of Foil.

The judgment heretofore entered should be reversed

and judgment should be entered in favor of Hove as a matter of law.
DATED this 28th day of April, 1980.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

~~\ Q j~A44=
JOh ~ Anderson

ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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